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is unsystematic and infrequently  subjected to close examination,  and it usually 
remains almost entirely hidden from the analyst and his audience. When we 
talked informally  to historians  about this, they often replied  by referring  to their 
own craft skills. One implication  of this paper is that it may be necessary for 
historians  to attend more explicitly to the way in which their craft is exercised 
in compiling histories from the interpretative  work of participants. 
We believe that this suggestion will be found to be most convincing by those 
readers  who are led to scrutinize  their own current  and not yet fully interpreted 
historical or sociological material in the light of our discussion and who are 
thereby made more sensitive to  the highly variable interpretative  work per- 
formed by their subjects. The pages above, then, are offered not as proving a 
case, but as identifying  a series of issues worthy of consideration  by historians 
as well as by sociologists of science. 
In summarizing  the implications  for sociology of material  similar  to that pre- 
sented here, we have argued that sociologists should pay much more attention 
to the nature of scientists' discourse instead of trying, with but little success, 
to use that discourse as the empirical  basis for their own supposedly definitive 
versions of what is going on in science. The conclusions of this paper suggest 
that a historian's account will remain merely one among many plausible ac- 
counts. We are not suggesting, of  course, that historians should cease  con- 
structing  their own historical accounts; but rather, that they should take up the 
supplementary  goal of describing and documenting  the various repertoires  and 
interpretative  devices used by participants  and, perhaps, of trying to explain 
how different repertoires and devices come to be adopted in different social 
settings and in different historical  periods. 
Talking History: Reflections on 
Discourse Analysis 
By Steven Shapin* 
His writing is not about something; 
it is that something  itself. 
-SAMUEL  BECKETT  on James Joyce 
Gilbert and Mulkay declare  above  that historians can go about their usual busi- 
ness,  but  "that they  should  take  up the  supplementary  goal  of  describing  and 
documenting  the  various  repertoires  and interpretative  devices  used  by  partic- 
ipants and, perhaps, of trying to explain how different  repertoires  and devices 
come to be adopted in different social settings and in different historical pe- 
riods." This is  a  salutary recommendation, although it would have been of 
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greater assistance  had they  exemplified  their preferred practice  using materials 
historians  encounter  more  routinely  than  interview  transcripts.1  Scientists  do 
talk in different ways  in different contexts:  in published  work,  laboratory note- 
books,  after-dinner speeches,  and in interviews  by sociologists.  Talk is not just 
an account  of  behavior  and belief;  it is  itself  behavior  that varies  according  to 
audience  and purpose.  It would be a great mistake for historians to give  a priv- 
ileged  status  to  talk in any one  setting.  No  type  of  talk,  taken by  itself,  offers 
the  historian  direct  access  to  historical  reality.  Gilbert and  Mulkay  are  to  be 
thanked for reminding us of this fact. 
This,  then, is Gilbert and Mulkay's  "inclusive" program of discourse  analysis: 
in addition  to  our usual  historical  projects  we  should  describe  and explain  the 
situated  variability  of  scientists'  talk.  If  this  were  all  that  was  implied,  there 
would  be  nothing  with  which  to  quarrel.  Unfortunately,  this is  not  all.  Gilbert 
and Mulkay have  produced  a series  of  other papers over  the past few  years  in 
which  they  recommend  something  more radical and restrictive.  It is entirely le- 
gitimate  to  discuss  the  "restrictive"  program here,  for  the  present  paper cites 
without  comment  or correction  the  work  advocating  that program of  research. 
Far from saying that historians  should also  examine  talk, Gilbert and Mulkay's 
restrictive  program says  that we  must only examine  talk. Their "supplementary 
goal" of describing and explaining scientists'  variable talk indicates one direction 
of work; in their restrictive  program the goal of describing and explaining action 
and belief  is  said to be chimerical.2 
Gilbert and Mulkay's  restrictive  program of  discourse  analysis  raises  issues 
of fundamental importance  to historians  and sociologists  of  science.  It contains 
four elements:  (1) an account  of  the  existing  practice  of  historians  and (other) 
sociologists;  (2) a diagnosis of irremediable flaws in that practice; (3) a statement 
that discourse  analysis  does  not  suffer from  these  defects;  and  (4) a  claim  to 
originality in the treatment of scientists'  talk. I will very briefly indicate that all 
these  elements  contain  mistakes. 
1.  In  Gilbert  and  Mulkay's  opinion  all  other  "analysts"  (historians  and  so- 
ciologists)  seek  to  " 'tell it like it is' " in science;  to say  "this is the way things 
actually  happen[ed]";  to  offer  "'definitive  accounts  of  scientists'  actions  and 
beliefs'  "; to  produce  the  "one  best  version"  of  scientific  episodes.3  One won- 
' Others have argued that certain pictures of the nature of science  cannot be drawn without  "par- 
ticipant  observation";  see,  e.g.,  H.  M.  Collins,  "Understanding  Science,"  Fundamenta  Scientiae, 
1981, 2:367-380;  but even  Collins concedes  that certain examples  of historical practice can approach 
the understanding afforded to  the participant observer;  see  p.  380. 
2 Many  people  count  inconsistency  as  a criticism,  invalidating all the  statements  involved.  That 
is not my position.  Inconsistency  can always  be repaired in principle; I am asking that it be repaired 
in practice,  so  that historians  can know  what it is they  are being offered. 
3 These,  and similar, locutions  (emphases  and quotation marks preserved)  appear in almost all of 
Gilbert and  Mulkay's  discourse  analysis  papers;  see,  e.g.,  Michael  Mulkay  and G.  Nigel  Gilbert, 
"What is the Ultimate Question?  Some Remarks in Defence  of the Analysis  of Scientific Discourse," 
Social  Studies  of Science,  1982, 12:309-319,  on pp. 310-311;  Mulkay and Gilbert, "Accounting  for 
Error: How  Scientists  Construct Their Social  World when They  Account  for Correct and Incorrect 
Belief,"  Sociology,  1982, 16:165-183,  esp.  p.  181; Gilbert and Mulkay,  "Contexts  of Scientific  Dis- 
course:  Social  Accounting  in Experimental  Papers,"  in The Social  Process  of  Scientific  Investiga- 
tion,  ed.  Karin D.  Knorr, Roger Krohn,  and Richard Whitley (Sociology  of the Sciences  Yearbook 
4,  1980) (Dordrecht: Reidel,  1981), pp. 269-294,  esp.  pp. 269-270;  Gilbert and Mulkay, "Warranting 
Scientific  Belief,"  Soc.  Stud.  Sci.,  1982,  12:383-408,  on  p.  383;  Mulkay,  "Action  and  Belief  or 
Scientific Discourse?  A Possible  Way of Ending Intellectual Vassalage  in Social Studies of Science," 
Philosophy  of  the  Social  Sciences,  1981, 11:163-172,  on  pp.  163-164;  Mulkay and Gilbert,  "Sci- 
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ders  whether  anyone  believes  that only  "one  best  version"  of  matters  can  be 
offered:  I can point  to an animal and say  "pig," and I can point again and say 
"pink hairy beast"  or  "abomination."  I do  not  think any  of  these  versions  is 
"the  best."  So  far  as  Gilbert  and  Mulkay's  view  of  historians'  work  is  con- 
cerned,  it  is  either  trivially  true  or fundamentally  false.  We  do  not  label  our 
accounts  as  imaginative  fictions  because  we  hope  they  are not.  Our goal  is in- 
deed telling it wie es eigentlich  gewesen.  If this is what Gilbert and Mulkay mean 
by  seeking  to  offer  "definitive  accounts,"  we  should  be  proud to  plead guilty. 
However,  having  this  goal  does  not  commit  us  to  being  simple-minded  about 
how  it is realized  or about the nature of the accounts  that are its end products. 
Historians  routinely accept  that their accounts  are theoretical  and interpretative 
in character,  that their adequacy  or inadequacy  depends  upon  historians'  pur- 
poses,  and  that,  consequently,  they  may  say  as  much  about  us  as  about  the 
historical  past.  E.  H.  Carr has  surely  supplanted  Leopold  von  Ranke  in histo- 
rians' favor.4 Gilbert and Mulkay portray the historian as a methodological  naif, 
but they  offer  no evidence  to  support this view. 
2.  What  is  supposed  to  be  wrong  with  seeking  to  provide  "definitive"  ac- 
counts?  According  to Gilbert and Mulkay, the problem arises from the real vari- 
ability  of  scientists'  talk.  What  the  historian  or  (other)  sociologist  does  is  to 
select  and validate  one  form of talk and to  say  "this is the way things  actually 
.  .  . happened."  As Mulkay says,  "The analyst's  underlying methodological  pro- 
cedure  here is to accept  statements  at face  value  if they  occur  often  enough."5 
This would indeed be a devastating indictment of existing practice if it accurately 
described  what historians  do.  But it does  not.  It is routine,  if not universal,  for 
historians  to  note  variability in scientists'  accounts,  to compare  one  sort of ut- 
terance  with  another and with the overall  pattern of  scientists'  verbal and non- 
verbal behavior.6 
Gilbert and Mulkay are, however,  right about one thing: historians do exhibit 
some of their subjects'  statements  as especially  revealing.  For example,  the his- 
torian may  have  a  theory  about  a  scientist's  aims  in which  exhibiting  the  sci- 
entist saying "this was my aim.  . ." counts as evidence.  But Gilbert and Mulkay 
are wrong if they think that this is a case  of taking the scientist's  words  "at face 
value."  It  is  not,  because  it  is  the  result  of  interpretative  work,  providing  a 
framework  and justifying  the  special  status  accorded  to  the  words.  Moreover, 
the cited  utterances  are not selected  because  of their "frequency,"  but because 
entists' Theory  Talk,"  Canadian  Journdl  of Sociology, 1983,  8:179-197, on pp. 181, 195;  and Gilbert 
and Mulkay, "Experiments  are the Key," Isis, 75:105-125, on pp. 107, 123, 124. 
4 Edward  Hallett Carr, What  is History?  (New York: Vintage Books, 1961),  esp. Ch. 1. 
5 Mulkay, "Action and Belief or Scientific Discourse?" pp. 164, 168; cf. Gilbert and Mulkay, 
"Warranting  Scientific  Belief," p. 384. 
6 Here is a short  list of such historical  work:  P. B. Wood, "Methodology  and Apologetics:  Thomas 
Sprat's  History  of  the Royal  Society,"  The British Journal for  the History  of  Science,  1980, 13:1- 
26; Martin  J. S. Rudwick, "Charles  Darwin in London: The Integration  of Public and Private Sci- 
ence," Isis, 1982, 73:186-206; Dorinda  Outram,  "The Language  of Natural  Power:  The 'Eloges' of 
Georges  Cuvier  and the Public  Language  of Nineteenth  Century  Science," History  of Science, 1978, 
16:153-178;  Owen Hannaway,  The Chemists and the Word: The Didactic  Origins of Chemistry (Bal- 
timore:  Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975);  Nicholas Fisher, "Avogadro,  the Chemists, and Histo- 
rians  of Chemistry,"  Hist. Sci., 1982,  20:77-102, 212-231; J. R. R. Christie  and  J. V. Golinski,  "The 
Spreading  of the Word:  New Directions  in the Historiography  of Chemistry  1600-1800,"  Hist. Sci., 
1982, 20:235-266;  James  R.  Jacob,  Henry Stubbe,  Radical  Protestantism  and the Early Enlighten- 
ment (Cambridge:  Cambridge  Univ. Press, 1983). 
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of  their explanatory  significance.  The historian might well  regard the  most  fre- 
quently  encountered  utterances  as an unreliable account  of a scientist's  aims. 
3.  Gilbert and Mulkay's  strictures do not apply to any one  type  of historical 
practice:  to  "externalism"  versus  "internalism," to the sociology  of knowledge 
versus  the  history  of  ideas.7 They  apply  to all descriptive  and explanatory  en- 
terprises  whatsoever,  to everyday  speech,  and, presumably,  to the observation 
reports  of  the  natural sciences.  "It is  simply  impossible  to  produce  definitive 
versions  of  scientists'  actions  and beliefs";  all that existing  approaches  to  un- 
derstanding have  yielded  is  "an analytical  impasse"  and an  "Analytical  Tower 
of Babel."  What "wise man," Gilbert and Mulkay ask,  "does  not retreat from" 
this  "impasse"?8 
Our release  from  this  "impasse"  is,  according  to  Gilbert and Mulkay,  their 
restrictive program of discourse  analysis: not as a "supplementary goal" (as they 
say  in the present  paper),  not as just  another thing historians  might do,  but as 
a  total  replacement  of  all  existing  approaches  to  understanding  science:  "My 
formulation,"  Mulkay  says, 
does not present scientific discourse as just another  topic to be covered in this area. 
The analysis of discourse is being presented  as an alternative  to the more traditional 
concern with describing  and explaining  action and belief. . . . [T]he traditional  ob- 
jective of describing  and explaining  what really happened  has been abandoned  and 
replaced with an attempt to describe the recurrent  forms of discourse.9 
The  inconsistencies  between  restrictive  and  inclusive  programs  seem  irrepa- 
rable.  In  apparently  more  recently  written  papers,  however,  Mulkay  and  his 
collaborators  present  yet  another  claim:  the  analysis  of  discourse  is  to  have 
"methodological"  or  "analytical" priority over  traditional exercises;  one  has to 
do discourse  analysis  "at least  initially."10 This position  only  confuses  matters, 
for Mulkay et al.  do not offer any way  of getting from their restrictive  program 
back  to  description  and  explanation  of  science.  Moreover,  there  is  no  logical 
way  of doing this except  by the  abandonment of the restrictive  program. 
Gilbert  and  Mulkay's  restrictive  program seeks  to  replace  "why-questions" 
with  "how-questions."  "Instead  of  asking: What is really going  on in science? 
7 For  reasons  possibly  having  to  do  with  the  local  topography  of  the  sociology  of  science  in 
Britain, discourse  analysts  have preferred to attack "externalist" or "interest explanation" empirical 
studies.  Still,  the fully general nature of their criticisms  of description  and explanation  is stipulated; 
see,  e.g.,  Steve  Woolgar,  "Interests  and Explanation  in the  Social  Study  of  Science,"  Soc.  Stud. 
Sci.,  1981,  11:365-394;  and  Steven  Yearley,  "The Relationship  between  Epistemological  and  So- 
ciological  Cognitive  Interests:  Some Ambiguities  Underlying the Use  of Interest Theory in the Study 
of Scientific  Knowledge,"  Studies  in History  and Philosophy  of Science,  1982, 13:353-388.  Both of 
these  condemn  the work of Donald  MacKenzie,  especially  his  "Statistical Theory and Social  Inter- 
ests:  A  Case  Study,"  Soc.  Stud.  Sci.,  1978, 8:35-83.  For  replies  to  Woolgar,  see  Barry Barnes, 
"On the  'Hows'  and  'Whys'  of  Cultural Change,"  Soc.  Stud.  Sci.,  1981, 11:481-498;  and Donald 
MacKenzie,  "Interests,  Positivism  and  History,"  ibid.,  498-504;  and,  for a response  to  Yearley, 
see  MacKenzie,  "Reply to  Steven  Yearley,"  Stud.  Hist.  Phil.  Sci.,  in press. 
8 Mulkay,  "Action  and Belief  or Scientific  Discourse?"  p.  169; Mulkay and Gilbert "What is  the 
Ultimate  Question?,"  p.  310; cf.  Mulkay and Gilbert,  "Scientists'  Theory  Talk,"  pp.  181-182. 
9 Mulkay,  "Action  and Belief  or Scientific  Discourse?"  pp.  163,  170. 
10  Mulkay and Gilbert,  "Joking Apart: Some  Recommendations  Concerning  the Analysis  of  Sci- 
entific  Culture,"  Soc.  Stud.  Sci.,  1982, 12:585-613,  esp.  pp.  588-589,  610; Michael  Mulkay,  Jon- 
athan Potter, and Steven  Yearley,  "Why an Analysis  of Scientific Discourse  is Needed,"  in Science 
Observed: Perspectives  on the Social  Study of Science,  ed. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay 
(London:  Sage,  1983), pp.  171-203,  on pp.  195-196,  200. 
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we should try asking:  How do scientists construct  their versions of what is going 
on in science?" This "more modest and more answerable"  question "must be 
given analytical priority." We cannot know action and belief through talk; all 
we can do is to "reflect  upon" the "patterned  character"  of talk itself. They say 
that the discourse analyst "is no longer required  to go beyond the data."1 This 
is the crucial point: discourse analysis is offered as a form of theory- and in- 
terpretation-free  historical and sociological practice. 
Of course, in reality Gilbert and Mulkay are just like the historians and so- 
ciologists they condemn: they too "go beyond the data." Gilbert  and Mulkay's 
work is constitutively interpretative.  As Collins has already noted, scientists' 
talk is "no more or less transparent  than any other data."'2  Take any quotation 
from Gilbert  and Mulkay's present paper. What is it that makes it visible as an 
instance of "empiricist"  or of "contingent"  accounting?  Try the experiment  of 
reading  their quotation 3, which Gilbert and Mulkay offer as "empiricist"  talk, 
as riddled with "contingent"  locutions. This reading is perfectly possible: the 
"contingencies" might involve  what  scientists  know  about the  mentioned 
biochemists, what significance is  accorded to their "working  on their own," 
being "largely  ignored," and so forth. I do not argue that Gilbert  and Mulkay's 
interpretations  are wrong, only that they are interpretations  and not pure data. 
Discourse analysis is not, in this respect, qualitatively  different  from the sorts 
of practice Gilbert and Mulkay's restrictive program criticizes. Their recom- 
mended way out of our alleged "analytical  impasse" cannot be travelled. 
4.  Finally, we have the claim that discourse analysis is a radically new ini- 
tiative in the study of science. Gilbert and Mulkay say that their approach is 
"unusual,"  that is "presages  a major  conceptual  change," that it is an alternative 
"to almost all prior work."13  Priority  is not important.  What is important  is the 
availability  of empirical studies from which historians might benefit. So far as 
Gilbert  and Mulkay's restrictive program  is concerned, one might well concede 
their claims to novelty and priority, although, as I have argued, their practice 
belies their recommendations  not to "go beyond the data." So far as the more 
inclusive and liberal program  of describing  and explaining  variable talk is con- 
cerned, Gilbert and Mulkay's claims to originality  are hardly warranted.  There 
are a number  of such studies in the empirical  literature,  including  a fine example 
by Mulkay  himself. In that paper Mulkay  analyzed scientists' talk about norms, 
explaining  its variation  in different  contexts in terms of scientists' interests and 
audiences. This paper, presumably  now repudiated  by its author, represents a 
model of how attention to scientists' talk can be fruitfully  integrated  with the 
traditional  historians' goals of describing  and explaining  action and belief.14 
'1 Mulkay  and Gilbert, "What  is the Ultimate Question?"  pp. 310, 314-315 (cf. Mulkay, Potter, 
and Yearley, "Why  an Analysis of Scientific  Discourse is Needed," p. 200.) 
12 H. M. Collins, "An Empirical  Relativist  Programme  in the Sociology of Scientific  Knowledge," 
in Science Observed,  ed. Knorr-Cetina  and Mulkay,  pp. 85-113, on p. 102. Readers  are referred  to 
Collins' perceptive  remarks  on this subject (esp. pp. 101-104). 
13 Mulkay  and Gilbert, "Accounting  for Error,"  p. 182;  Mulkay "Action  and Belief or Scientific 
Discourse?"  p.  163; see  also  Mulkay and Gilbert,  "What is the  Ultimate  Question?"  pp.  310,  312; 
Mulkay and Gilbert,  "Scientists'  Theory  Talk,"  p.  194. 
14 M. J. Mulkay,  "Norms  and  Ideology  in  Science,"  Social  Science  Information,  1976,  15:637- 
656.  This  paper  is  summarized  in  Mulkay's  Science  and  the  Sociology  of  Knowledge  (London: 
George Allen  & Unwin,  1979), pp.  112-113,  along with a series  of empirical explanatory  studies  of 
the type  he now regards as failures (Ch. 4). For exemplary  treatments of scientists'  talk in different 
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The historiographic  issues  involved  in the analysis  of talk are not trivial.  Sci- 
entists'  talk constitutes  a major portion of historians'  evidence,  and a more re- 
flective  attitude  to  our  handling of  that evidence  can  only  be  a good  thing.  I 
have  shown  that,  in practice,  Gilbert and Mulkay  offer  historians  not one  but 
two  programs for treating talk.  Their restrictive  program, if accepted,  involves 
a radical narrowing of historians'  goals and procedures.  The more inclusive  pro- 
gram can  be,  and  has  already  been,  assimilated  into  our normal range of  de- 
scriptive  and explanatory  projects.  The attractions of the inclusive  program are 
already evident  in historians' practice; the weaknesses  of the restrictive program 
are ones  of principle.  It is therefore  scarcely  surprising that they have not been 
counterbalanced  by any  significant concrete  achievements. 
forums, see H. M. Collins and T. J. Pinch, "The  Construction  of the Paranormal:  Nothing  Unscien- 
tific is Happening,"  in On the Margins  of Science:  The Social  Construction of Rejected  Knowledge, 
ed. Roy Wallis (Sociological  Review Monograph,  No. 27) (Keele, Staffs.: Keele University, 1979), 
pp. 237-270;  idem, Frames  of Meaning:  The Social  Construction of Extraordinary Science  (London: 
Routledge  & Kegan Paul, 1982), esp. pp. 109-110, 121-125; also Steve Woolgar, "Writing  an In- 
tellectual History of Scientific Development:  The Use of Discovery Accounts," Soc. Stud. Sci., 
1976, 6:395-422;  Bruno  Latour  and  Steve  Woolgar,  Laboratory  Life:  The Social  Construction  of 
Scientific Facts (London: Sage, 1979),  pp. 75ff.; and, for an analysis of scientists' rhetorical  tech- 
niques  for imputing  bias, Steven Shapin,  "The  Politics  of Observation:  Cerebral  Anatomy  and Social 
Interests  in the Edinburgh  Phrenology  Disputes,"  in On the Margins  of Science, ed. Wallis,  pp. 139- 
178. See also works cited in note 6. 
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